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 DO FIXED EXCHANGE RATES FETTER 
MONETARY POLICY?






The problem [with ﬁ  xed exchange rates or exchange-rate targeting] is 
that with capital mobility the targeting country no longer can pursue 
its own independent monetary policy and so loses its ability to use 
monetary policy to respond to domestic shocks that are independent 
of those hitting the anchor country. Frederic S. Mishkin [2004, 490]
INTRODUCTION
The quote above reﬂ  ects the widely accepted proposition that monetary authori-
ties in small open economies cannot engage in independent monetary policy actions 
while simultaneously adhering to a ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange rates, 
such as found under a gold standard or exchange-rate targeting, impede the ability of 
the monetary authorities to stabilize the macro economy [Eichengreen, 1992, 2002]. 
Expansionary monetary policy actions, for example, produce balance of payments 
deﬁ  cits that require equal and offsetting contractionary monetary policy actions in 
order to maintain the ﬁ  xed exchange rate. This proposition is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated in the standard Mundell-Fleming model. The elimination of monetary policy 
as a stabilization tool under ﬁ  xed exchange rates is a primary factor leading many 
economists to support ﬂ  exible exchange rate regimes. Support for this view comes 
from the improved economic performance of those countries that abandoned the gold 
standard during the Great Depression and were thus able to engage in independent 
monetary stabilization actions.1
In this paper, we combine the Mundell-Fleming model with a credit channel 
model developed by Bernanke and Blinder [1988] to show that monetary policy is 
not entirely fettered under a ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime.2 Following Bernanke and 
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are not perfect substitutes and we ignore credit rationing.3 Monetary policy is potent 
in our model, although in a limited way. Monetary policies that inﬂ  uence the money 
multiplier can affect aggregate demand, while those (e.g., open-market operations) 
that alter only the monetary base remain impotent. In the next section, we discuss 
the models and the relevant comparative static ﬁ  ndings. We then develop a model 
simulation to investigate whether the effects we hypothesize can be non-trivial. 
THE MODEL
The Mundell-Fleming (M-F) model is an open-economy IS-LM model with a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate (π∗) and ﬁ  xed price level (P*). The traditional version of the model as-
sumes no wealth (or Pigou) effect and perfect capital mobility that ﬁ  xes the interest 
rate on bonds, i, at i*, the world interest rate. As is the case for the closed-economy 
IS-LM model, M-F is a pure demand model; aggregate supply is assumed perfectly 
elastic at the ﬁ  xed price level and merely adjusts to changes in demand. The M-F 
model is represented by two equations with two unknowns:
(1)  E(y, i*,π*) = y
(2)  L(y, i*) = m x B/P*
Simplifying, by deleting the exogenous variables:
(3)  E(y) = y
(4)  L(y) = m x B
Equation (1) or (3) represents the goods market equilibrium (the traditional IS 
curve) where aggregate expenditure (E) equals aggregate output (y). Equation (2) or 
(4) represents the money market equilibrium (the traditional LM curve). The right-
hand side of equation (2) or (4) is the money supply, expressed as the product of the 
money multiplier, m, and the monetary base, B. The unknowns in M-F are equilibrium 
output, y, and the money supply, m x B, or simply B if m is assumed exogenous. 
Following standard assumptions, the money multiplier is a function of banks’ 
required reserve ratio, r, their excess reserve ratio, e, and the non-bank public’s cur-
rency to deposit ratio, c: 
  m = m(r,e,c),
where partials mr , me , mc < 0. For simplicity, we assume that all three variables af-
fecting the money multiplier are exogenous. This assumption is reasonable given that 
the interest rate, the primary determinant of the multiplier in most money supply 
models, is exogenous. In accordance with Walras’ Law, we drop a third equation for 
ﬁ  nancial assets (bonds) from the model. 
The M-F model is solved recursively. The goods market equation (3) alone de-
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impotent as the money supply is endogenously determined. An attempt by the mon-
etary authority to increase B, for example, eventually leads to offsetting actions to 
decrease B in order to maintain the ﬁ  xed exchange rate. Likewise, changes in the 
required reserve ratio that affect the money multiplier require offsetting movements 
in B leaving the money supply unchanged. This yields the well-known M-F implica-
tion that monetary policy is impotent at affecting aggregate demand under a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regime.
We now expand the traditional M-F model to allow for the inclusion of another 
ﬁ  nancial asset, bank loans, that carry their own interest rate,ρ. Following Bernanke 
and Blinder’s [1988] version of the credit-view model for a closed economy, we assume 
that bank loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes. Further, we assume that, while 
bonds trade internationally with perfect mobility, information costs and other market 
imperfections prevent bank loans from trading internationally.4 We modify the goods 
market equation and add equation (6):
(5)  E(y, ρ ,α) = y
(6)  Z(y, ρ ) = λ(ρ ,β) x (m - 1) x B
Equation (5) alters the traditional goods market equation by incorporating the interest 
rate on bank loans, ρ , as a determinant of the demand for goods. The variable α is an 
autonomous shock variable. Equation (6) is the equilibrium equation for bank loans. 
The demand function for bank loans is Z. It depends on y, i, and ρ (in this equation, 
the exogenous variable, i*, is dropped). The right-hand side of equation (6) represents 
bank loan supply, which depends on bank credit, (m – 1) x B, and the share of bank 
credit allocated to bank loans (as opposed to bonds), λ. The share of bank loans depends 
on both the rate on loans, ρ, and the exogenously determined rate on bonds (dropped 
from the λ function). The variable β is another autonomous shock variable. The bank 
credit multiplier, m – 1, is easily derived from the bank balance sheet.5 The revised 
model consists of equations (4), (5), and (6).6 The variables y, ρ, and B are endogenous. 
We assume the usual signs for the partial derivatives. In addition, following Bernanke 
and Blinder [1988], E ρ<0, Zy>0, L ρ <0, λρ >0. 
In this model, we are assuming that bonds trade in international markets with 
perfect mobility at the world determined interest rate, i*, while the second earning 
asset, bank loans, only trades domestically or imperfectly internationally.7 The “closed 
economy” assumption regarding bank loans is most likely to hold for those countries 
whose bank loans have little liquidity and where information costs for outsiders are 
high. This assumption and resulting model might also apply in a historical context to 
the developed countries prior to innovations in bank-loan securitization.
As in the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, an open-market operation or a 
change in the discount rate (holding all exogenous variables constant) that leads to 
a change in B cannot be maintained under the ﬁ  xed-exchange rate regime. Since B 
is an endogenous variable, it must return to its original value in order to return the 
model to equilibrium at the original exchange rate. Thus, open market operations and 
discount rate changes that attempt to alter the monetary base are impotent tools.196 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In contrast, no such impotence befalls policies that alter the money multiplier, 
m. The reserve requirement, r, for example, regains its role as an aggregate demand 
management tool. Taking the total derivatives of equations (4), (5) and (6) and apply-
ing Cramer’s Rule to compute the change in y arising from an autonomous change in 
m (such as that caused by a change in r), we obtain8
(7)  dy/dm = - (λ EρB)/D > 0
where,
(8)  D = -EρmZy + (Zρ –(m–1)Bλρ)(m)(Ey – 1) + λ(m – 1)LyEρ > 0.
Dynamic stability conditions require a positive sign on D (see Appendix A for 
details). In this modiﬁ  ed model, an autonomous increase in the money multiplier 
produces an increase in aggregate demand. For example, a decrease in reserve re-
quirements (causing an autonomous increase in the multiplier) leads to an increase in 
bank loans, a lower equilibrium bank loan rate, ρ, and a higher aggregate demand, y. 
Inspection of equation (2) reveals that the higher y (and, consequently, higher money 
demand) must yield a higher money supply in the new equilibrium. If the desired ex-
cess reserve ratio is inﬂ  uenced by the discount rate, changes in the discount rate will 
also affect the money multiplier and aggregate demand. In contrast to the standard 
Mundell-Fleming model, the induced change in the endogenous monetary base fails 
to offset fully the change in the money multiplier. The reason that the change in the 
multiplier is no longer neutral in this credit view model centers on the differential 
effect of the multiplier change on the money supply and on bank loans. A change in 
the monetary base alone cannot bring the money and loan markets both back into 
equilibrium simultaneously. Hence, changes in the other endogenous variables are 
needed to reestablish overall equilibrium.
It should be noted that money multiplier changes arising from actions by the non-
bank public that change c or actions by the banks that change e now produce aggregate 
demand shocks. These shocks cannot be offset by open-market operations that affect 
B, as B is endogenous, but can be offset by policies that return the money multiplier 
to its prior level (e.g., using reserve requirement changes) or by ﬁ  scal policies.
Figure 1 presents graphically the effect of an increase in the money multiplier 
on y and ρ. We solve equation (4) for B and insert this function into equation (6). The 
model is now reduced to two equations and two unknowns, y and ρ. The endogenous 
variable B is suppressed and determined at the intersection of the remaining two 
functions. The modiﬁ  ed equation (6) (and curve in Figure 1) is labeled FA, denoting 
the overall “ﬁ  nancial asset market.” At every point on the FA curve the money and 
loan markets clear. An increase in the money multiplier—for instance, from a reduc-
tion in reserve requirements--shifts the FA curve downward and to the right causing 
the equilibrium y to rise and ρ to fall, as the equilibrium moves from intersection 1 
to intersection 2 in the ﬁ  gure.
Table 1 reports how various shocks affect income, the rate on bank loans, the 
monetary base, and the money supply. Among other results, the comparative static 197 FIXED EXCHANGE RATES
analysis reveals that an autonomous rise in λ, the percentage of bank assets held in 
loans, increases equilibrium y. This result is consistent with the ﬁ  ndings from the Ber-
nanke-Blinder closed-economy model. The next section discusses a simulation model used 
for estimating the impact of a change in the reserve requirement on aggregate demand.
  FIGURE 1  
  Effect of an increase in the money multiplier
 TABLE  1
  Effects of Shocks on Endogenous Variables
Exogenous  Income  Loan rate  Monetary base  Money supply
change in:     (y) (ρ)  (B)  (mB)                
Money multiplier (m) +  -  ?  +
Loan ratio (β) +  -  +  + 
Goods demand (α)  +  + + +
SIMULATION
The foregoing analysis of the credit-view model indicates that changes in reserve 
requirements affect aggregate demand, even in a setting with ﬁ  xed exchange rates. 
However, without empirical evidence we cannot say whether the connection between 
bank reserve requirements and aggregate demand is economically signiﬁ  cant. How-
ever, in an effort to shed at least some light on this issue, we assume plausible values 
(explained in detail in Appendix B) for the variables and parameters in equations (7) 
and (8) and simulate the change in real output (i.e., aggregate demand) that would 
result from a speciﬁ  c change in the reserve requirement. We do not presume that 
these simulations are empirically accurate predictions. Obviously, the transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy and bank lending is much more complex than described 
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model is based. Careful empirical work is needed to answer deﬁ  nitively whether or 
not money multiplier shocks produce non-trivial aggregate demand shocks in ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regimes. All we seek to establish here is whether money multiplier 
shocks arising from changes in the reserve requirement can generate non-trivial 
demand shocks under plausible conditions. 
First, as a small initial step, we identiﬁ  ed various features of an economy that 
would make reserve requirement changes more effective. Inspection of equations (7) 
and (8) reveals several factors that have unambiguous impacts on the effectiveness 
of reserve requirement changes (that is, on dy/dm). Reserve requirement decreases 
would have relatively greater stimulative effects, ceteris paribus, in economies with 
the following features:9 
1)  a relatively large and interest-insensitive bank loan supply (i.e., a high λ, B, 
and m (caused perhaps by low c and e) and a low λρ);10
2)  bank loan demand relatively sensitive to lending rates but not to income (i.e., 
a high Zρ and a low Zy);
3)  money demand relatively sensitive to income (i.e., a large Ly); and
4)  demand for goods that is relatively sensitive to both bank lending rates and 
income (i.e., a high Eρ and Ey). 11
Secondly, in order to provide some admittedly rough approximations to the quan-
titative relevance of reserve requirement changes under differing circumstances, we 
conducted a series of simulations (described in Appendix B) based upon equations (7) 
and (8). The speciﬁ  c objective of the simulations is to provide some indication of the 
responsiveness of aggregate demand to a small reserve requirement change, under 
various plausible assumptions about the parameters in the three markets in our model 
(i.e., the markets for goods, money, and bank loans).
To conduct a simulation with equations (7) and (8), we clearly need values for 1) 
the variables m, λ and B; and, 2) the coefﬁ  cients λρ, Zρ, Zy, Ly, Eρ and Ey. As explained 
more fully in Appendix B, we derived values for the coefﬁ  cients from an assumed set 
of reasonable values for their corresponding elasticities. This step required further 
assumptions about values for the following variables appearing in the elasticities: ρ, 
E (= y), L, and Z. We assume constant elasticities within the relevant range. 
In selecting baseline values for the various variables and elasticities, we paid 
close attention to the above-described features that create an economic environment 
responsive to reserve requirement changes. While we wanted to avoid a set of values 
that would doom reserve requirements to failure as a policy instrument, we likewise 
wanted to avoid those values that would inevitably make reserve requirements look 
highly effective. In other words, we make conservative assumptions about the values 
for variables and elasticities. We report results of sensitivity analyses to show the 
importance of these various assumptions. 
The key values underlying the baseline simulation are shown in Table 2 (εij denotes 
the elasticity of variable i with respect to variable j). We suggested above that reserve 
requirement reductions would be more stimulative in economies with 1) relatively 
high values for λ, B, m, εZρ, εLy, εEρ and εEy; and 2) relatively low values for εZy and ελρ. 
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sible and conservative (in the sense of neither being relatively large or small). The 
apparent exception is εEρ = 0.05, a small elasticity indeed. Nevertheless, this value is 
still a (very) conservative one, since a small εEρ tends to reduce the potency of reserve 
requirement changes. Further, as we note in Appendix B, there is ample reason to 
expect that εEρ is, in fact, rather small.
  TABLE 2
  Baseline Simulation Results
 Variable  or  Baseline  Δ in Overall Impact of a ceteris paribus 10% 
  Elasticity  Values  increase (decrease) in variable or elasticitya
  E(= y)     10    b
  m     3.25    c
  c     0.3  -.0080%      (.0096%)
  r     0.1    d
  λ     0.4  .0798%      (-.0634%)
  Be      1    b
  ρ    .05    b
 ε λρ     0.5  -.0386%      (.0554%)
 ε Ζρ    -0.5a  .0494%      (-.0422%)
 ε Ζy     1.0  -.0057%      (.0060%)
 ε Ly     1.0  .0060%      (-.0057%)
 ε Eρ   -0.05a  .0494%      (-.0422%)
 ε Ey     0.3  .0211%      (-.0181%)
Overall Impact: %Δ in E from a 10% cut in r = 0.25%
a. For reasons explained in Appendix B,εΖρ and εEρ vary in tandem.
b. Variation in variable works through variation in associated elasticities.
c.  m varies as a result of changes in c (or r); it does not vary independently.  The money multiplier and c 
are connected, in the simplest money multiplier model, by the equation: 
   m = (1 + c)/(c + r).
d. Variation in r is what produces the overall impact shown at the bottom of the table.
e. B is arbitrarily set equal to 1; all other monetary values are scaled accordingly.
The overall impact of a 10 percent reduction in reserve requirements on E (= y) 
is calculated from an estimate of the elasticity of real spending with respect to the 
reserve requirement: εEr = [((dy/dm)(dm/dr))(r/y)], where dm/dr = -(1+c)/(c+r)2. Apply-
ing the baseline values in Table 2 to equations (7) and (8) yields dy/dm = 0.314, or εEm 
= 0.102. The value for dm/dr is -0.813, or εmr = -0.25. Combining these results gives 
us εEr = -0.025 (= -0.25*0.102). Accordingly, a 1-point reduction in r — for instance, 
from 10 percent of deposits to 9 percent — yields a 0.25 percent increase in E for our 
baseline simulation.
The last column in Table 2 shows how small (ceteris paribus) changes in selected 
key variables or elasticities alter the estimated overall impact of a change in r on E. 
For instance, if λ increased to 0.44 from 0.4, the overall impact of changes in r on E 
would increase by 0.08 percentage points, from 0.25 percent to 0.33 percent. Among 
the elasticities, εEρ, εZρ and ελρ appear to have the largest inﬂ  uence on the overall im-
pact of r on E. As far as we can establish, little or nothing is known about the actual 
empirical magnitudes of these elasticities. And this may be especially true for small 
developing economies, where data availability is often problematic. So, an effort to 
establish the empirical magnitudes of these elasticities appears fruitful.200 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
CONCLUDING REMARKS
If we focus on the United States, we might conclude that ﬁ  xed-exchange rates and 
reserve requirement changes are things of the past. Global data reveal a different 
picture. Shatz and Tarr [2000] report that over 45 percent of 185 countries surveyed 
adhered to some type of pegged exchange rate. While the reserve requirement is no 
longer a monetary policy tool of choice in the United States, the reserve requirement 
remains an active policy tool in various other countries.12 As examples, Brazil, China, 
Ghana, Moldova, and Mexico recently have announced changes in their reserve re-
quirements to affect monetary aggregates (sources: various news media). 
The open-economy credit-view model with ﬁ  xed exchange rates provides vari-
ous predictions that deviate substantially from the predictions of the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming model. Most importantly, the credit-view model indicates that an 
independent monetary policy is possible despite adherence to a ﬁ  xed exchange rate 
regime. Monetary policy tools that affect the money multiplier affect aggregate de-
mand. Autonomous changes in the other determinants of the money multiplier also 
produce changes in real aggregate demand. This ﬁ  nding suggests, for example, that 
a country adhering to a ﬁ  xed-exchange rate regime and experiencing an increase 
in its currency-to-deposit ratio would encounter an adverse demand shock despite 
equilibrating increases in the monetary base. Second, consistent with the Bernanke-
Blinder closed-economy model, autonomous bank portfolio shifts between bonds and 
loans affect aggregate demand and are a potential source of instability in the economy. 
Thus, our analysis reveals several previously unidentiﬁ  ed determinants of aggregate 
demand for small, open economies and suggests new areas for empirical research. 
  APPENDIX A
Let α and β be autonomous shift parameters. The model is:
(1)  E(y, i*, ρ, α) = y
(2)  L(y, i*) = mB
(3)  Z(y, i*, ρ) =  (i*, ρ, β) (m – 1)B
Proof that dy/dm > 0
Total differentiation of the model and arranging exogenous variables on the right-
hand side yields:
(1') (Ey – 1)dy + Eρdρ = -Eαdα
(2')  Lydy – mdB = Bdm
  
(3')  Zydy + (Zρ - (m-1)Bλρ)dρ - λ(m-1)dB = λBdm + (m-1)Bλβdβ  201 FIXED EXCHANGE RATES
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or,
 D  = Eρ(–m) Zy + (Zρ – (m – 1)Bλρ)m(Ey – 1) + λ(m – 1) LyEρ    
The sign for D is ambiguous as the ﬁ  rst two terms are positive while the last term is 
negative. Dynamic stability, however, requires that D > 0 (shown below).
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or,
 -mEρ λ B + λ(m-1)BEρ
This reduces to
 -Eρ λ B > 0
Thus, dy/dm is unambiguously positive if D > 0.
Proof that D > 0
The solution to the numerator matrix for dy/dαis -mEα(Zρ- (m-1)Bλρ). This is un-
ambiguously positive. Thus, an autonomous rise in the demand for goods can lower y if 
and only if D < 0. This, however, is a dynamically unstable possibility. Solve equation 
(2) for B and substitute into equation (3). We now have one equation in two unknowns, 
ρ and y. When this new equation (designated FA) holds, the money and loan markets 
clear. The FA curve may be upward or downward sloping. However, if it is downward 
sloping, it must be ﬂ  atter than the IS curve for dynamic stability. 
Figure A-1 below shows what happens if the FA curve is steeper than IS and an 
autonomous increase in goods expenditures occurs. The comparative static prediction 
is that income (y) falls. In the ﬁ  gure, the equilibrium moves from point 1 to 2. If we 
make the dynamic assumption that the money and loan markets always clear, then 
the economy will always be positioned on the FA curve. A rightward shift in IS will 
leave the economy on the FA curve, but below the IS curve (point 1). This represents 
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from the predicted comparative static equilibrium at point 2. Thus, when FA is more 
steeply sloped than IS, the model predicts a fall in y when autonomous expenditure 
demand increases. This is a dynamically unstable case and is rejected. This case only 
occurs if D < 0, since the numerator for dy/dα is unambiguously positive. As a result, 
D < 0 is rejected and D is signed positive.
 FIGURE  A
  1- Dynamically unstable case (D < 0)
 APPENDIX  B
  Assumptions Underlying the Simulation
The simulations require values for the following variables and partial deriva-
tives (see equations (6) and (7)): λ, B, m, Ly, Zy, Zρ, λρ, Ey, and Eρ. To derive values for 
the partial derivatives, we also need values for the levels of several other variables, 
namely L, Z, ρ, and E (= y). Some of the values we use are supported by empirical 
evidence (see below). Unfortunately, empirical estimates are not available for every 
parameter required to simulate dy/dm. So, some values are supported simply by in-
formed “guesses” about plausible but conservative magnitudes.
A. Values and Justiﬁ  cations for , B, and m
 = 0.4  We assume that 40 percent of bank assets are in loans with the remain-
der being in bonds (i.e., marketable securities). This is a conservative assumption as 
Barajas, et al. [2005] report that λ exceeds 0.5 for Africa and Latin America. If banks 
held a larger percentage of assets in loans, dy/dm would be larger.
B = 1.0  We arbitrarily normalize B to 1.0. Other dollar-denominated variables 
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m = 3.25  The money multiplier is computed using the formula,
  m = (1+c)/(r+c)
We assume a reserve requirement, r, of 0.1 and a currency to deposit ratio, c, of 
0.3. These values are consistent with those reported by Garcia-Herrero [1997] for 
several small open economies.
B. Values and Justiﬁ  cations for the Partial Derivatives
Ly = 0.325. We derive values for the six partial derivatives needed to estimate 
dy/dm by assuming plausible values for relevant elasticities and for levels of variables 
and then computing the partial derivatives. For example, we compute the partial Ly 
by assuming ﬁ  rst the value for the income elasticity of money demand The formula 
for the elasticity is: εLy = Ly*(y/L) .
 If we select reasonable values for the elasticity and for L and y, we can solve for 
a plausible value for Ly. As is commonly the case for the income elasticity of money 
demand, we assume that εLy = 1. (For supporting examples of studies of money demand 
in small open economies, see Cuevas [2002] and Treichel [1997].) We set y equal to 10 
times the monetary base, B (or y = 10). This relationship between B and y is consistent 
with those of many countries, according to information provided to us by the World 
Bank (available from the authors upon request). Further, L = mB, so L = 3.25*1 = 
3.25. It follows that Ly = 0.325 as a baseline value.
Zy = 0.09. To calculate this partial, we assume that the income elasticity of loan 
demand is 1.0, implying that a one-percent increase in income would raise loan de-
mand by one percent. For Z (=λ*(m-1)*B), the value implied by the RHS variables is 
0.9. So, the implied value for Zy is 0.09 (= εZy*( Z /y) = 1*(0.9/10)).
Z = -9.0. To calculate this partial, we assume a value for the elasticity of loan 
demand with respect to the bank loan rate (ρ) equal to -0.50. So, borrowing is taken 
as relatively inelastic with respect to the bank lending rate. This follows from a pre-
sumption that bank-dependent ﬁ  rms do not generally have good substitute sources 
of credit. The formula to calculate Zρ is -εΖρ* (Z/ρ) = -0.5*(0.9/.05) = -9.0. 
 = 4. As ρ  increases, banks adjust their portfolios by substituting more of the 
less-liquid loans for the more liquid bonds. In the absence of any direct empirical evi-
dence on the responsiveness of portfolio shifts to changes in ρ, we assume a baseline 
elasticity equal to 0.5 for deriving λρ. The relatively low elasticity value is in keeping 
with the idea that bank loans may entail considerable risk. So, a substantial increase 
in loan quantity would need to be accompanied by a very substantial increase in bank 
loan rates, other things the same. Given ελρ = 0.5, λ = 0.4 and ρ = 0.05, then λρ = 4.
Ey = 0.30 (the marginal propensity to consume domestic output). The par-
tial is calculated by assuming a marginal propensity to consume domestic or foreign 
goods and services from disposable income (MPC) of 0.90, an income tax rate (t) of 
0.33 and a marginal propensity to import out of gross income (π) of 0.3. The MPCd 
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produce a relatively small expenditure multiplier (1.42), which serves to dampen any 
expenditure impact from loan sector shocks. The MPC selected is lower than that for 
the U.S., but higher than that for South Korea; the tax rate suggests a reasonably 
sized government sector and the marginal propensity to import suggests a fairly open 
economy (substantially more open than the U.S., for example).
E = -9.0. This partial derivative is derived differently from the others. To ﬁ  x 
ideas, consider a decline in ρ. This change encourages additional expenditures (a 
higher E) ﬁ  nanced by borrowing from banks. In other words, the demand for bank 
loans is derived from the desire to spend more because of a lower borrowing cost. We 
make the very conservative assumption that any additional spending represented 
by Eρ is fully ﬁ  nanced by additional bank borrowing, implying that Eρ = Zρ= -9.0. 
(An alternative assumption is that some of the additional spending is ﬁ  nanced with 
non-bank funds, such as retained earnings. If so, then Eρ > Zρ.) With Eρ = -9.0, the 
implied elasticity for E with respect to ρ is εEρ = 0.045 = -(-9)*(0.05/10). Assuming a 
larger value for Eρ increases the magnitude of dy/dm, so our assumption of a small 
Eρ is indeed a conservative one.
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1.  Eichengreen [2002] reviews the various papers supporting this view.
2.  The Bernanke and Blinder [1988] model and the adaptation of their approach to the Mundell-Flem-
ing model undertaken in this paper fall into the literature arguing that assets markets and ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries can have aggregate demand effects that go well beyond those envisioned by a simple 
LM curve. See, Gertler [1988] for a review of the literature broadening the channel of ﬁ  nancial market 
effects.
3.  For the early work using these assumptions see Tobin [1970] and Brunner and Meltzer [1972].
4.  See Hubbard [1998] for an extensive review of the literature surrounding capital-market imperfections 
and “bank-dependent” borrowers and their implications for monetary and ﬁ  scal policy.
5.  Bank assets are reserves (R) + bank credit (BC) while liabilities are deposits, D. D equals the money 
supply, M, minus currency held outside the banks, C. R + BC = M - C, so BC = M - R – C. Since B = 
R + C, BC = M - B. And since M = mxB, BC = (m - 1) x B. See also the seminal work by Brunner and 
Meltzer [1968].
6.  Following Bernanke and Blinder [1988], money demand continues to depend only on the bond inter-
est rate. This represents the opportunity cost for holding money as the public only holds bonds and 
cannot own bank loans.
7.  The model that we develop formally here is consistent with a model presented by Driscoll [2004]. He 
also applies the Bernanke-Blinder model to small, open economies and tests it with data for the U.S. 
states.
8.  See Appendix A for details.
9.  With the exception of λ, magnitudes for all of the following factors may be constrained by stability 
considerations for the model. That is, stability requirements assure that dy/dm > 0. While one could 
select parameter values that would force dy/dm < 0, we rule out such possibilities.
10.  The money multiplier, m, depends on the currency-to-deposit ratio, c, the reserve requirement, r, and 
the excess reserve ratio, e. A high m requires a low combined value for c, e, and r.
11.  Mathematically, an increase in Eρ , under certain conditions, may cause dy/dm to fall. However, a 
simulation analysis (described in Appendix B) suggests that such an outcome would not occur for any 
set of reasonable values for the parameters deﬁ  ning dy/dm (see equations (7) and (8)).
12.  Changes in U.S. reserve requirements since 1980 have furthered equity and efﬁ  ciency objectives 
(e.g., uniformity across various classes of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries) rather than serving as a tool for 
aggregate demand management. 205 FIXED EXCHANGE RATES
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